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NOTES
HOUSING FOR THE ELDERLY: CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS AND OUR OBLIGATIONS
"Old age may be a distinction, but in itself
it is not an honor."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The desirability and necessity of adequate housing for the elderly
have been unequivocally recognized in recent years. 2 While some
municipalities have made no provisions to accommodate this need
of the aged, others have responded affirmatively by enacting zoning
ordinances permitting planned retirement communities. These com-
munities have sought to meet senior citizens' unique needs, with
adequate roads for emergency vehicles, more and wider walkways
with fewer stairs, interiors and exteriors designed to permit easy
social contact, common rooms, short distances between buildings and
well-lighted walkways and halls.3 Individuals have also sought to
guarantee suitable accommodations for the elderly by employing
restrictive covenants which limit residency in a certain area to persons
Within given age limits.4
1. Deyo, Reminiscences After Sixty-Four Years at the Bar, 19 N.Y. ST. B.A. BULL.
213, 217 (1947).
2. See, e.g., Senior Citizens Housing Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-723, 76 Stat. 670
(1962). The Senior Citizens Housing Act, among other things, amended the National
Housing Act to read in pertinent part:
The Congress finds that there is a large and growing need for suitable housing
for older people both in urban and rural areas. Our older citizens face special
problems in meeting their housing needs because of the prevalence of modest
and limited income among the elderly . ..and their need for housing planned
and designed to include features necessary to the safety and convenience of the
occupants in a suitable neighborhood environment. The Congress further finds
that the present programs for housing the elderly . . . have demonstrated the
urgent need for an expanded and more comprehensive effort to meet our
responsibilities to our senior citizens.
12 U.S.C. § 1701(m) (1970). See also PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON AGING, TOWARD A
BRIGHTER FUTURE FOR THE ELDERLY (1970); Melman, Housing for the Aged-The Govern-
ment Response: An Analysis of the Missouri Boarding House for the Aged Law, 8 Ur.
LAw. 123 (1976).
3. See NEW JERSEY OFFICE ON AGING, A COMMUNITY GUIDE: HOUSING NEW JERSEY'S
ELDERLY (1971). In addition, the elderly are less often victims of crime when they
live in communities for the elderly. Gubrium, Victimization in Old Age: Available
Evidence and Three Hypotheses, 20 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 245, 247 (1974).
4. A third solution, not discussed in this note, is boarding houses for the aged.
See Melman, supra note 2. See also FLA. STAT. ch. 651 (1975); Commentary, Florida's
Life Care Law: Revitalizing a Dormant Statute to Protect the Aged, 28 U. FLA. L. REV.
1016 (1976).
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These zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants have been sub-
ject to constitutional attack, since they often exclude younger families,
particularly those with children. 5 This note will examine to what
extent, without violating constitutional provisions, a municipality or
individual may utilize zoning ordinances or restrictive covenants to
afford the elderly housing designed to meet their needs. It will also
explore to what extent, if any, a municipality has an obligation to
assure the aged adequate accommodations. This writer will argue that
municipal and private attempts to provide the elderly with retire-
ment communities should-with rare exception-be sustained against
constitutional attack, and that there ought to be an affirmative obliga-
tion for municipalities to provide such assistance.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION
State or municipal actions which seek to resolve a problem shared
by a distinct group such as the elderly may be challenged as violations
of both state and federal equal protection guarantees. In respond-
ing to the needs of one segment of society, the state or local govern-
ment arguably may impinge on the constitutional rights of another
group.
Through the appellate process, the New Jersey courts have supplied
answers to many of the constitutional problems posed by zoning
ordinances favoring the elderly. In Taxpayers Association v. Weymouth
Township,6 a New Jersey intermediate appellate court struck down
an ordinance which required that occupancy in a public trailer park
be limited to persons of age fifty-two and older. The court reasoned
that in an attempt to provide dwellings which the elderly in need of
housing could afford, the municipality invidiously discriminated by
excluding low-income persons under age fifty-two.7 Two years later, a
New Jersey appellate court invalidated another municipal attempt to
provide the aged with accommodations tailored to their needs. In
Shepard v. Woodland Township Committee and Planning Board,8 the
court struck down an ordinance which, in addition to authorizing
accommodations for the aged, permitted limited commercial facilities
5. The most common attacks are based upon equal protection and due process
grounds, invoking both federal and state constitutions. The other recurrent attack
upon zoning ordinances is a charge of ultra vires, i.e., that the ordinances are outside
the municipality's authority granted under the state's enabling act. Each of these
methods of attack will be discussed more fully in this note.
6. 311 A.2d 187 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), rev'd, 364 A.2d 1016 (N.J. 1976).
7. Id. at 190. The age limit was found violative of the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution; the state constitution was not invoked.
8. 342 A.2d 853 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev'd 364 A.2d 1005 (.N.J. 1976).
1977] NOTES
and service establishments, intended primarily for the use and con-
venience of the residents, and required recreational and cultural facili-
ties for their sole use.9 The township argued that the Shepard ordinance,
unlike the Weymouth one, was inclusionary because it did not restrict
property to one type of use or single class of users:
The ordinance in the Weymouth case may easily be distinguished
from ... [the one in] this case. There was a total and unequivocal
exclusion [in Weymouth] of any and all mobile homes in the town-
ship except those owned and occupied by "elderly" persons, de-
fined and thereby classified by a defined age.
There is no exclusion of any class, type or number of persons
in any zone in the Woodland Township ordinance. The owner of
a parcel of land may use it in various ways, restricted only by
normal residential and agricultural uses. One of these methods of
use, open to a landowner qualified to do so, is the use as a senior
citizens' community. 10
Defendant was, in essence, arguing that the ordinance was inclusion-
ary and not exclusionary as was the Weymouth ordinance. The court
did not find this argument persuasive, however, and found Weymouth
controlling."
9. Woodland Township argued that the following ordinance, authorizing senior
citizen housing, was a permissible exception to the residential-agricultural zone, authorized
by the Act of April 3, 1928, ch. 274, § 3, 1928 N.J. Laws 696 (repealed and replaced
by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55 D-62, -65 (West Supp. 1977)):
8. Senior Citizen Communities. In R-A Zones where one or more parcels,
of land having a contiguous total area of at least 500 acres are under common
ownership or control, there may be established a Senior Citizen Community
in accordance with the laws of the State of New Jersey and with the following
additional requirements:
a. Age and Occupancy Requirements. The permanent residents of a Senior
Citizen Community shall be confined to persons who are 52 years of age or
over ....
342 A.2d at 854.
10. Brief for Defendants-Respondents at 16-17, Shepard v. Woodland Township
Comm. & Planning Bd., 342 A.2d 853 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
11. 342 A.2d at 855. The dissent responded to the plaintiff's position that the
ordinance was exclusionary by asserting:
The ordinance, however, does not designate a use district exclusively for senior
citizens housing and it is not suggested that in its failure to provide an exclusive
district for this [special] use, the ordinance transcends the authority of the zoning
statutes. . . . There has been no showing, Prima facie or otherwise, that the
allowance of such a use within the township trenches unduly upon other land
areas available for general housing or would bar entry into the municipality of
all classes of persons in need of reasonable housing.
Id. at 859 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The dissent asserted that the
ordinance should be sustained because it did not invidiously discriminate.
The majority did not expressly discuss the equal protection issue, but their approval
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On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered Shepard
and Weymouth as companion cases and reversed in a landmark de-
cision.1 2 Following an in-depth discourse in Weymouth on the particu-
lar problems of the aged,' 3 a unanimous court held that the ordinances
were repugnant neither to the United States14 nor to the New Jersey
Constitutions.-
A. Federal Equal Protection
Under traditional equal protection analysis, the United States
Supreme Court has applied one of two tests, depending on the subject
matter of the attempted regulation. When a suspect class or funda-
mental right is involved, a zoning ordinance will be subject to strict
judicial scrutiny, and the municipality will be required to demon-
strate that the ordinance serves a compelling state interest.' 6 On the
other hand, the party attacking an ordinance not discriminating against
a suspect class or not denying a fundamental right must show that it
lacks a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.1" Recogniz-
ing that age is not a suspect class'8 nor housing a fundamental right 9
of Weymouth and the lower court's reasoning indicates that the court believed the
ordinance was violative of equal protection. The dissent noted:
The trial judge also determined that the age and occupancy restrictions were
unconstitutionally discriminatory. The ordinanecs [sic] permitting senior citizen
communities may have the potentiality for this mischief-the inviduous [sic] exclu-
sion from the municipality of persons entitled to reasonable housing.
Id.
12. Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 364 A.2d 1005 (N.J.
1976); Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 364 A.2d 1016 (N.J. 1976).
13. 364 A.2d at 1025-30.
14. Id. at 1035.
15. Id. at 1036. Although plaintiffs did not allege that the ordinances were
violative of the state's equal protection clause, the court addressed the possible future
contention with dicta. Id.
16. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
The differentiation between minimal and strict scrutiny is the essence of the traditional
two-tier test of equal protection.
17. So long as a legitimate state interest could conceivably have been the intent
of the legislature, the statute will survive. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238
(1976).
18. 364 A.2d at 1034. The court cited Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976) (mandatory retirement age for state police).
Two potential rationales for categorizing groups as suspect are the unalterable
traits of the persons and the political impotence of the group. Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1126-27 (1969). See also Ely, The Constitu-
tionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cii. L. REV. 723, 730 n.36 (1974); Karst,
Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-
Process" Formula, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 716, 742-43 (1969). Old age would seem to
fall into both of these categories. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not granted
the elderly "suspect" classification.
. 19. 364 A.2d at 1034, citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
NOTES
under the United States Constitution, 20 the Weymouth court applied
traditional equal protection analysis to the federal constitutional
attack.2 1 Thus, the Weymouth ordinance was sustained.
The Taxpayers Association feared that by zoning portions of its
undeveloped land for the aged, a municipality might prevent de-
velopment of that land as housing for other less welcome segments
of the population. In particular, the plaintiffs were concerned that
municipalities would zone for the aged in an effort to avoid school-
aged children 22 and the concomitant costs of more schools, thereby
holding down their taxes.2 This concern led the court to require
supplemental briefs on the effect of the exclusionary practices, and
the court concluded:
The peril to which our attention is drawn is a significant one.
This court recently had occasion to condemn zoning practices
which deny a realistic opportunity to certain classes of people to
live in desirable communities. Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v.
Mt. Laurel Tp., . . . 336 A.2d 713. In that case, we determined the
impropriety of attempts by municipalities to improve their financial
position by selectively restricting new housing to categories of
people who are not revenue producers, i.e., those whose local tax
contribution exceeds their demands upon locally financed govern-
mental services. . . We also disapproved of attempts to restrain
increases in school expenditures by directly or indirectly excluding
families with children ...
[However,] it seems obvious that the seriousness of any exclu-
sionary threat will depend upon the circumstances of each case,
including in particular the relationship which the population,
area, and available vacant land within the municipality bears to
that within the areas occupied by the senior citizens communities.24
The Weymouth court reasoned that the best means of safeguarding
against the exclusionary effect is to insist that similar housing for less
welcome residents exist in other districts within the municipality.5
20. Although the standing requirements may not have been satisfied, the Weymouth
parties did not raise standing as an issue.
21. Id. at 1034-37.
22. Id. at 1038-39. Defendants' expert on housing for the aged characterized
the effect of development permitted by the ordinance as "architectural birth control."
Id. at 1039. Most of the briefs filed by the plaintiffs were statistical and mathematical
demonstrations, along with economic arguments.
23. See generally Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
24. 364 A.2d at 1038-39.
25. Id. at 1040. If the senior citizens communities are too large, the exclu-
sionary problem would not be avoided by providing (as did the Shepard ordinance)
for other uses within the zoning district.
1977 1
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In the instant case, the ordinance was found to be in accordance with
a comprehensive municipal plan; thus, the exclusionary effect had
been averted.2 6 But where a comprehensive plan is challenged as being
inadequate, this aspect of the decision could become a focal point
of analysis. Since the Weymouth ordinance was in accordance
with a comprehensive plan, it seems that the adverse effect upon
the interests in Weymouth Township was relatively insubstantial. This
seems particularly true in light of the importance of the interests
which the state seeks to promote, namely, providing for the needs
of the elderly and remedying past housing discrimination directed
towards the aged. Weymouth explored the unique social, psychological,
economic, and physical needs of the elderly.2 7 Since the state has an
interest in promoting the well-being of its citizens, assisting the elderly
in meeting those needs is of significant importance. The state has an
additional interest in remedying past discrimination. 28 The United
States Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of
measures to remedy past racial discrimination, where the remedial
measures themselves involve direct discrimination on the basis of race,
e.g., through quotas.- The Supreme Court has subjected state action
aimed at rectifying past discrimination based on sex to minimum
scrutiny.2 0 Discrimination based on age might be more properly com-
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1025-30.
28. Regarding racial discrimination, the Supreme Court has stated: ".[The
[district] court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will
so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past .... "'" Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 770 (1976), quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
29. The question is now pending in Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d
1152 (Cal. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977) (No. 76-811). In an earlier case,
the Washington Supreme Court, construing the United States Constitution, held that
the state interest in remedying the effects of past discrimination must be a compelling
one in order to classify on the basis of race. The court found "the state interest in
eliminating racial imbalance within public legal education to be compelling." DeFunis
v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1182 (Wash. 1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
30. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), Justice Brennan, speaking for a
plurality of the Court, struck down a statute which discriminated on the basis of sex
and treated sex as a suspect class. But he carefully distinguished the statute from one
which was "designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination against women," id.
at 689 n.22, suggesting the latter type of discrimination may not be subject to the same
compelling standard. The Frontiero plurality's labeling of sex as a suspect class has
never been accepted by a majority of the Court. See Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
In Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), Justice Douglas, speaking for a six-justice
majority, held that a state tax exemption for widows (but not for widowers) was
-reasonably related to the legitimate state policy of cushioning the financial impact of
spousal loss upon the sex for whom the loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden.
Distinguishing Frontiero, the Kahn Court stated that the Frontiero statutes were " 'not
in any sense designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination against women.'" Id.
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pared to sex rather than racial discrimination, since age, like gender,
is not a suspect classification."'
In order to establish that the state action is aimed at remedying
past discrimination, past discrimination must be shown. This may
sound anomalous, but proof is often difficult. Under the Supreme
Court's standard enunciated in Washington v. Davis3 2 and Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.,33 it must be shown that an
intent to discriminate existed. Thus, in Bakke v. Regents of the Uni-
versity of Californias8 the California Supreme Court, relying on
Washington, held that a medical school admission policy which pro-
vided for a quota to be filled by minority students was violative of
equal protection absent a showing of past discrimination.3 5 Without
proof of past intent to discriminate, the University did not meet its
burden of demonstrating the compelling state interest of remedying
past discrimination." Past intent to discriminate against the aged
could be difficult to demonstrate," particularly in light of the Supreme
Court's position in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,38
where the Court stated: "While the treatment of the aged in this
Nation has not been wholly free of discrimination, such persons ...
at 355 n.8, quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 689 n.22. Thus, the Court
implied that statutes designed to rectify past discrimination against women might be
subject to minimal scrutiny. But it is questionable if the Kahn statute was designed
to remedy past sex discrimination. In dissent, Justice White wrote: "[I]f the State's
purpose was to compensate for past discrimination against females, surely it would not
have limited the exemption to women who are widows." Id. at 361. Contra, Cramer v.
Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1976) (holding an affirmative
action plan aimed at correcting past discrimination in employment violative of equal
protection).
31. See note 18 supra.
32. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
33. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
34. 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
35. The University also argued that the validity of quota admission programs should
be determined by the more lenient "rational basis" test. It reasoned that the stricter
"compelling interest" standard should be employed only when the classification dis-
criminates against a minority. The court rejected the University's "proposition that
deprivation based upon race is subject to a less demanding standard of review under
the Fourteenth Amendment if the race discriminated against is the majority rather
than a minority." Id. at 1163.
36. See O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context,
60 VA. L. REV. 925, 930 (1974).
37. In Arlington Heights, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977), the Court suggested four avenues
along which to trace a municipality's intent to discriminate via a zoning ordinance:
(1) the historical background of the zoning decision; (2) the specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision; (3) departures from the normal procedure; and
(4) legislative or administrative history. Id. at 564-65,
38. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
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have not experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment' .... "9
Despite the increased burden of proof imposed upon remedial pro-
grams and the nonrecognition of age as a suspect class, the courts
have not retreated from the principle that remedying past discrimina-
tion is an important state interest.
As to the appropriate judicial test to apply, it can be argued that
governmental action which seeks to aid a traditionally disadvantaged
group should be presumptively valid. When a democratically elected
legislative body which controls the decisionmaking process, particu-
larly at the local level, rectifies a problem so as to advantage the aged
and disadvantage themselves, the reasons for suspicion and therefore a
stringent standard of review are absent.40
The apparent purpose of the zoning ordinance is to accommodate
the unique housing needs of older persons. The substantiality of the
connection between this purpose and the classification of elderly
persons may be challenged only in regard to the age limit at which
the legislature draws the line. The selection of fifty-two years of age
as the boundary was an obstacle which the intermediate appellate
courts could not overcome. 41 While the New Jersey Supreme Court
conceded that the line is somewhat arbitrary,4 2 they reasoned that
"[t]he specification is a legislative judgment which ought not to be
disturbed unless it exceeds the bounds of reasonable choice." 43 Thus,
the legislative classification of persons over fifty-two years of age was
39. Id. at 313.
40. This was not the approach taken by the Washington Supreme Court in DeFunis,
507 P.2d 1169 (Wash. 1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). There, the court
did not consider whether the discrimination was seeking to aid a traditionally disad-
vantaged group. The fourteenth amendment was interpreted literally; consequently,
the language, "[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the
laws" was taken to apply to state action depriving whites of equal protection as well
as to state action depriving blacks of equal protection. In light of the history of
the amendment,, this approach is questionable. Cf. United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey, 97 S. Ct. 996, 1009-10 (1977) (in upholding apportionment legislation, three
justices stated: "There is no doubt that in preparing the 1974 legislation, the State
deliberately used race [classifications] in a purposeful manner. But its plan represented
no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race, and we discern no
discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .'). But see McDonald v.
Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (a white citizen may have a cause of action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1981). See also Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination,
41.U. CHi. L. REv. 723, 735 (1974).
41. In Weymouth, the New Jersey intermediate appellate court found the age
limit to be unauthorized, unreasonable, and violative of equal protection. 311 A.2d
at 189-90.
42. 364 A.2d at 1035.
43.. Id. The court- added: "Though the elderly are commonly defined as those
persons approximately 65 years old, it cannot be said that 52 is unreasonable or without
a factual basis." Id.
NOTES
held directly and logically related to the legitimate state interest of
making accommodations available to the elderly.44
In evaluating the validity of the zoning practices in Shepard and
Weymouth, the New Jersey Supreme Court apparently did not con-
sider it material that the Shepard ordinance was inclusionary, i.e., the
zoning classification permitted (included) other uses besides housing
for the aged, while the Weymouth ordinance was exclusionary, i.e.,
the zoning classification allowed only housing for the aged and ex-
cluded all other uses. The fact that the Shepard ordinance was in-
clusionary (that is, allowed for other uses) resulted in its being viewed
more favorably when the issue of ultra vires"5 was encountered. 6 But
with regard to the exclusionary impact of retirement communities, the
court stated: "And if [the retirement communities] were excessively
large, the exclusionary impact would not necessarily be obviated by
requiring that some similar housing . . . be permitted within the
same zoning district.' ' 47 Thus, in New Jersey, an inclusionary ordinance
making accommodations available to the aged will not have less severe
constitutional ramifications than an exclusionary ordinance.
The Court of Appeals of New York, however, viewed the
inclusionary-exclusionary dichotomy in another light. In Maldini v.
Ambro,- a Huntington Township ordinance 49 similar to the Shepard
inclusionary ordinance, was upheld. The court reasoned: "It is one
thing for a local zoning board to deny an application [for a special
exception] based solely upon the age of the intended residents; it is
quite another for it to establish a zoning district allowing, among
other things, residences designed for, but not necessarily limited to,
44. Id. The intermediate appellate court objected that the classification was un-
reasonable because young, low income persons would be denied equal protection. 311
A.2d at 190. However, it seems the lower court placed excessive emphasis on economic
similarities between the poor and elderly, improperly ignoring the other distinct needs
of the elderly. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
45. See text accompanying notes 77-88 infra.
46. 364 A.2d at 1013.
47. Id. at 1039-40.
48. 330 N.E.2d 403 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975).
49. Building Zone Ordinance of Town of Huntington, ch. 62, § 4.9.01 reads:
In the R-RM Resident District a building or premises shall be used only for
the following purposes:
(1) Any use permitted in the R-80 Residence District [single family dwell-
ings . . ., farms, churches, schools and libraries].
(2) Multiple residences designed to provide living and dining accommodations,
including social, health care, or other supportive services and facilities for
aged persons .
(3) Any accessory use or structure permitted in the R-80 Residence District.
330 N.E.2d at 405. It should be noted that the ordinance in no way tried to define
"aged persons." Compare the Huntington with the Woodland Township ordinance,
supra note 9.
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aged persons." 50 The 5-2 decision of the New York Court of Appeals
was a breakthrough, since it was the first zoning case upholding a
senior citizen community. But the constitutionality of an ordinance
that was not inclusionary was left in doubt.
The Town of Brookhaven, New York, had also provided for a
retirement community, limiting occupancy to persons fifty-five and
older. But in Campbell v. Barraud,5' the trial court, relying on the Wey-
mouth appellate decision, declared the zoning ordinance violative of
equal protection.5 2 The court distinguished Maldini on the grounds
that unlike the Brookhaven ordinance, the Huntington zoning did
not regulate the age of the users of the housing.5 3 It is submitted that
the Campbell result is incorrect. As the Maldini court stated: "'Age'
considerations are appropriately made if rationally related to the
achievement of a proper governmental objective." 54 But Maldini
clearly establishes the inclusionary-exclusionary dichotomy as a relevant
distinction in New York.
The validity of the dichotomy is questionable; it seems that the
New Jersey view, as expressed in Weymouth and Shepard, is the
sounder position. Once permits are granted and developers begin to
build for a particular class of residents, other classes of users are de
facto excluded. The inclusionary ordinance has then become exclu-
sionary. Obviously, the distinction becomes tenuous. Essentially, the
same result is achieved whether a small exclusionary zone for the
aged or a larger inclusionary one is provided in the ordinance. Thus,
both inclusionary and exclusionary ordinances provide functionally
equivalent means of making accommodations available to the aged.
From one standpoint, the decision in Weymouth could have been
improved. The Weymouth plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued for the
establishment of a condition precedent rule: before a municipality
would be permitted to set a zone restricted for senior citizens, it
must demonstrate that the restriction would not, in the actual economic
market, tend to decrease the availability of housing for children. 55
50. 330 N.E.2d at 407 (emphasis added).
51. 376 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
52. Id. at 383-84.
53. Id. at 386.
54. 330 N.E.2d at 407.
55. Indeed, plaintiff's contention was that the township enacted the ordinance
expressly to exclude children. The "Concise Statement of Facts" in plaintiff's brief
reads: "A garbage collector and a land speculator got together and decided to con-
vince a small town that they could have new housing in the town without increasing
the number of children." Plaintiff's Brief at 1. The Weymouth plaintiffs put forth a
rather novel argument: the ordinance violates the fundamental rights of (1) survival,
(2) perception, (3) communication, (4) progeneration, (5) bodily integrity, (6) mental
security, (7) sabbath, (8) ambulation, (9) negotiation, These rights are said to be
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This is a problem for New Jersey and all other states which fund
schools substantially through ad valorem taxes on real property. 56 The
approval of a condition precedent rule could have served to limit the
possibilities of municipal attempts to take unfair advantage of the
Weymouth decision. 57
B. State Equal Protection
The degree of protection afforded by the courts can differ signifi-
cantly depending on whether the state or federal constitution is in-
voked.58 The Weymouth appellants' equal protection attack, based
both on alleged age discrimination and on a claimed right to housing,
was rejected on state as well as federal constitutional grounds. But
the New Jersey Supreme Court's analysis of the state constitutional
issues differed crucially from its federal constitutional analysis.
The Weymouth court asserted its adherence as a matter of state
constitutional practice to the federal two-tier method of analyzing
allegedly suspect classifications. Thus, with regard to the charge of
age discrimination, the court-finding age not a suspect classification
under state law-summarily rejected the equal protection claim of
age discrimination. 9
innate and to predate and preempt the Constitution. Id. at 5. Plaintiff also asserted
that these rights are present in the preamble of the Constitution along with the first,
fourth, fifth and eighth amendments.
Despite plaintiff's contentions, the courts construing land use ordinances have not
spoken to these "fundamental rights" in their opinions. But see Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977), discussed briefly in note 85 infra. Prior to publica-
tion of this note, however, a Florida appellate court ruled that restricting condominium
residents so as to preclude children under twelve years of age is unconstitutional.
Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., No. 76-1535 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug.
9, 1977). The court held that the restriction violated plaintiff's rights to marry and
procreate, citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966), Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
56. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Robinson
v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); FLA. STAT. § 236.012 (1975).
57. See generally Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
58. A state may constitutionally grant more protection to a right asserted under the
state constitution than is afforded the same right under the United States Constitution.
See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1976) (extension of Miranda rights
beyond federal standard); State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974) (right to jury trial
for petty offenses); People v. Jackson, 217 N.W.2d 22 (Mich. 1974) (right to counsel at
pretrial line-up); State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975) (requiring a higher standard
of knowing consent to waiver of fourth amendment rights); Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (right to housing);
Parham v. Municipal Ct.. 199 N.W.2d 501 (S.D. 1972) (right to jury trial for petty
offenses). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977).
59. 364 A.2d at 1036.
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The Weymouth court sidestepped a clear analysis of the federal
issues regarding a right to housing. Noting the Supreme Court's re-
jection of such a right, it merely left the plaintiffs with the in-
surmountable burden of showing that the zoning classification lacked
a rational basis. 60 The same was not found to be true under the New
Jersey Constitution, however. The Weymouth court had earlier found
in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel61
that "[t]here cannot be the slightest doubt that shelter, along with
food, are the most basic human needs. ' ' 62 Interpreting this earlier
statement, the court now found that it had "accorded the right to
decent housing a preferred status under our State Constitution."6 3
Through its use of the term "preferred status," the Weymouth
court avoided-perhaps deliberately-conflict with the Supreme Court's
rejection of a "fundamental" right to housing. The court, in fact,
rejected the viability of the term "fundamental right, ' ' 64 and thereby
moved away from the strictures of a two-tiered analysis. Instead the
court carefully weighed the "preferred status" of housing against
the municipality's interests reflected in the housing ordinance, for
"any governmental action which significantly impinges upon the
ability of some class of individuals to obtain this necessity of life
deserves close scrutiny." 65 But despite this close scrutiny, the court
found the municipality's interests dominant and rejected appellant's
attack based on a state constitutional right to housing."6
Thus, although appellants lost both their federal and state constitu-
tional attacks, the battle differed significantly on the respective grounds.
Under the state constitution, the right to housing proved a formidable
foe, forcing the court to a careful scrutiny of the municipality's purpose.
The suggestion is implicit that in the future, state equal protection
attacks can be made successfully on other, perhaps rational but less
justifiable, zoning restrictions. The court's doors are by no means shut.
C. The Restrictive Covenant
An alternative to the zoning ordinance when providing housing
for the elderly is the restrictive covenant applied in a common scheme.
In Riley v. Stoves,6 7 an action by owners of mobile home lots against
60. Id. at 1033-34.
61. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
62. Id. at 727.
63. 364 A.2d at 1037.
64. Id. at 1036.
65. Id. at 1037.
66. Id.
67. 526 P.2d 747 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974).
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other owners of lots, the court sustained a restrictive covenant limit-
ing occupancy of mobile homes to persons twenty-one years of age and
older. Though finding state action,- the court found the covenant did
not violate federal equal protection 0 because it was rationally related
to a legitimate state interest: providing an area for older buyers who
sought to retire in an area undisturbed by children.
Two crucial facts formed the basis of the decision: (1) there was
an absence of testimony as to any area shortage of housing which
would accommodate families with children, and (2) the area subject
to the covenants was a small portion within the subdivision. Both
factors check the possibility of constitutionally repugnant exclusion-
ary effects. The lack of any housing shortage allays the Weymouth
plaintiffs' principal grievance: the opportunity for a municipality to
limit expansion to segments of the population who would increase its
tax revenue without imposing a financial burden on the city facilities.
The second limitation on the covenant would fortify it against equal
protection and due process attacks. Although only briefly mentioned
in Weymouth, Riley presented many of the same problems and reached
basically the same result.
In Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., 70 a Florida court
held unconstitutional a restrictive covenant in a condominium deed
which excluded children under twelve. The court relied both on the
age discrimination and the abridgment of the fundamental rights of
marriage and procreation to invalidate the covenant. 71 Neither Wey-
mouth nor Riley was cited. The only distinguishing factor seemed to
be that the Franklin covenant was directly and intentionally aimed at
excluding children, while the Weymouth ordinance and arguably the
Riley covenant were aimed at permitting housing exclusively for the
aged.
III. DUE PROCESS ATrACKS
Equal protection attacks are generally accompanied by claims that
the ordinance or covenant is violative of substantive due process
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The constitutional guaran-
tee of substantive due process requires that the ordinance not be un-
68. The finding of state action was predicated upon Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948), where a racially restrictive covenant was found to be unenforceable as violative
of equal protection. The Supreme Court found that private agreements to exclude
persons of a designated race did not violate the fourteenth amendment; however, any
governmental action, including judicial proceedings to enforce the terms of the agree-
ment, would deny rights protected by the fourteenth amendment.
69. 526 P.2d at 752.
70. No. 76-1535 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. August 9, 1977).
71. Id. at 8. See note 55 supra.
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reasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that it bear a rational relation-
ship to a permissible legislative purpose. 7 2 Justice Pashman disposed of
the claim that this type of zoning ordinance violates due process:
"[T]he claim that the ordinances violate the due process clause is little
more than a restatement of the contention that they contravene
principles of equal protection .... As we have already found, the age
and occupancy provisions . . . bear a real and substantial relationship
to the ends sought."73 The converse is also true: those ordinances
which were found violative of equal protection (e.g., in the Weymouth
appellate opinion) were violative of due process as well.
For an ordinance to be reasonable and in accordance with the
general welfare, the legislating body should evidence a careful con-
sideration of the varying community and regional interests. q" Thus, it
becomes important that the ordinance allowing a senior citizens com-
munity also consider the special needs of the elderly residents.75 In
the states that have considered the question, the requirement that
varying interests be considered must be viewed in light of the housing
needs within the region.7 6 Complete regional exclusion of a class in
need of housing would tend to show that the various interests were not
properly weighed.
IV. ULTRA VINEs ATrACKS
A municipality's zoning power must be founded upon a legislative
delegation. In the absence of such a grant, zoning enactments will be
ultra vires and void.7 7 The ultra vires, equal protection, and due
process limitations on zoning overlap to some extent. To satisfy the
equal protection clause, the classification system used in the non-
exclusionary ordinance must be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. Due process requires that the ordinance not be unreasonable,
72. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
73. 364 A.2d at 1037.
74. In Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 283 A.2d 353, 358 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1971), afj'd 320 A.2d 223 (N.J. 1974), the court stated: "In pursuing the
valid zoning purpose of a balanced community, a municipality must not ignore housing
needs, that is, its fair proportion of the obligation to meet the housing needs of its
own population and of the region. Housing needs are encompassed in the general
welfare." See also Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel,
336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
75. See, e.g., Huntington Township ordinance, supra note 49.
76. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d
713, 732-33 (N.J. 1975).
77. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Golden v.
Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291, 296 (N.Y. 1972). The requirement for a
legislative delegation will not apply to those municipalities which have been granted
home rule powers under the state constitution.
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arbitrary, or capricious. The ultra vires doctrine demands that the
ordinance not exceed the zoning power granted to the municipality.78
These three limitations on zoning are not sharply distinguished in
many cases. Most ordinances which violate one contravene the others,
and the courts often decide any one issue using language of another.
Authority to zone is a component of the state's police power, that
is, its sovereign power to provide for the health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of its citizens. 9 Traditionally, each state has specifically
delegated its police power within the zoning sphere to the municipali-
ties, and the state's zoning enabling act generally grants the local
authorities wide discretion in exercising their zoning perogatives.80
Thus, the zoning decisions of local boards have been restricted only by
legislative enactments and judicial interpretations.8
When determining whether an ordinance is ultra vires, the court
will be inquiring whether the ordinance exceeds the authority granted
the zoning board. Since all of the police power of the state in the
area of zoning has been traditionally granted to the zoning board, the
issue of ultra vires becomes the issue of whether the police power
has been exceeded. The ultra vires doctrine ordinarily presents ques-
tions of state law. But where the state has delegated all of its power
in a given area to an agency, and that agency has allegedly exceeded
that delegated authority, the question of whether the agency has
exceeded its delegated power (ultra vires) is identical to the question
of whether the agency has exceeded the state's power within the area.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraass2 is the current Supreme Court
guideline for determining whether a zoning ordinance is a valid
78. 272 U.S. at 391-95.
79. Id. Section 1 of the STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT attaches the zoning
power securely to the police power. Authority is delegated "[]or the purpose of pro-
moting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community." R. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 26.01 (1968).
80. See, e.g., STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AT § 1, in R. ANDERSON, Supra
note 79.
81. In recent years states have retrieved some of their zoning power from localities
by enacting legislation which requires localities to weigh the regional and state implica-
tions of local land planning decisions. See, e.g., Florida Environmental Land and Water
Management Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (1975), held unconstitutional in part, Cross
Key Waterways v. Askew, No. Y-362 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1977). It may
also be necessary for zoning boards to consider the environmental impact of their
decisions. See, e.g., Seadade Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 245 So. 2d 209
(Fla. 1971); Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975, FLA. STAT. §§
163.3161-.3211 (1975). Furthermore, zoning boards may be restricted by legislation
which requires that rule-making bodies comply with procedural guidelines. See, e.g.,
Administrative Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1975); however, the applicability of
ch. 120 to certain local planning and zoning activities is not free from doubt. Compare
FLA. STAT. § 120.52(l)(h) _(c) (1976 Supp.) with FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(12), (17) (1975).
82. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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exercise of this facet of the state police power entrusted to the
municipality. In Belle Terre, six unrelated students sharing a home
challenged a zoning ordinance which restricted land use to single
family dwellings and defined family as "'[o]ne or more persons related
by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single
housekeeping unit. . . .A number of persons but not exceeding two
(2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though
not related . . . shall be deemed to constitute a family.' "8,3
The Court upheld the ordinance against attacks that, inter alia, it
was not within the police power of the municipality because it did
not promote the general welfare and was not rationally related to a
legitimate state interest: "The police power is not confined to elimi-
nation of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out
zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. "
84
Apparently, family values and clean air were a sufficiently substantial
concern of the municipality for the ordinance to contribute to the
general welfare.8 5
Belle Terre dispels the notion that zoning regulations can only
regulate land use and not land users. The Weymouth court recognized
that restrictions on land use frequently restrict those who may utilize
it: "[O]rdinances which regulate use by regulating identified users
are not inherently objectionable. "8 6 The concept of "use" is critical
when considering the constitutionality of retirement communities. The
Maldini dissent asserted that zoning regulations can only
regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size of build-
ings and other structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied,
the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the density of popula-
tion, and the location and use of buildings, structures and land for
trade, industry, residence or other purposes.87
The intermediate appellate court in Weymouth also contended that
the concept was limited to physical use. 8 This narrow reading of "use,"
limiting the term to actual physical use, is inconsistent with Belle Terre
83. Id. at 2.
84. Id. at 9.
85. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977), the Supreme Court
held that a zoning ordinance regulating the number of related persons who could live
together violated due process. The majority distinguished Belle Terre since that case
did not involve family members. See also Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc.,
No. 76-1535 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1977).
86. Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 364 A.2d at 1031.
87. 330 N.E.2d 403, 408 (N.Y. 1975) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
88. 311 A.2d at 189.
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and the modern view of zoning law which allows wide discretion to
the municipality in promoting the general welfare.
V. AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY
Once the constitutionality of retirement communities is established,
additional questions arise: (1) Does a municipality have an affirmative
duty to provide housing communities for the elderly; and (2) May
prospective residents and developers bring, suit to enforce such an
affirmative duty?
A. Standings9
Standing is the first problem encountered by persons attempting
to establish a legal obligation on the part of a community to permit
accommodations for the aged. The United States Supreme Court is
presently not receptive toward plaintiffs who assert that zoning
ordinances violate their constitutional rights. The Court has demon-
strated its hostility toward constitutional attacks on zoning ordinances
by severely restricting the concept of injury in fact, a customary pre-
requisite for standing. Thus, in Warth v. Seldin, 0 plaintiffs who
asserted that enforcement of a zoning ordinance effectively excluded
persons of low and moderate income from the town were denied
relief because they could not show sufficient injury in fact. The
plaintiffs were not residents of the suburb whose zoning ordinance
they were contesting. The Court held that a party "who seeks to
challenge exclusionary zoning practices must allege specific, concrete
facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that
he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's inter-
vention."9' 1 In some instances, however, the standing barrier is not
insurmountable. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.,92 a developer of low-income housing
was found to have standing because it could show a possible loss of
funds already expended on the project.9. In addition, the Court found
that the developer, a nonprofit corporation, had a legitimate, non-
economic interest in the project, that of making low-cost housing
available in areas where such housing was scarce.94
89. Standing was not an issue in Weymouth and Shepard because the parties never
raised it. 364 A.2d at 1023 n.5.
90. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
91. Id. at 508 (emphasis in original).
92. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
93. The Arlington Heights plaintiffs showed the Court detailed and comprehensive
plans to demonstrate that but for the ordinances, the project would be built. Id. at 562.
94. Id. "[E]conomic injury is not the only kind of injury that can support a
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In addition to the developer, an individual plaintiff was found to
have standing by virtue of his interest in finding housing near his
place of employment. The Court reasoned that if he is granted the
relief he seeks, "there is at least a 'substantial probability,' Warth v.
Seldin, . . . that the [housing] project will materialize, affording
[plaintiff] the housing opportunity he desires in Arlington Heights."95
Presumably, a developer of housing for the aged would likewise
have standing, if he could demonstrate that funds were invested, that
he acted in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and that there
existed a need for housing for the elderly.96 Arlington Heights leaves
open the question of whether the developer may raise the rights of
third parties once he has established threshold standing.9 7 Assuming
arguendo that an affirmative duty is placed on municipalities to allow
for housing for the aged, it is unclear whether a developer would be
able to assert a violation of that duty. Nevertheless, it would seem
that an aged person desiring to live in a retirement community would
have standing if the developer is prepared to build. The interest of an
aged person in living in a community that provides for his special
needs would be at least as great as the interest of the Arlington Heights
plaintiff who was deprived of housing near his employment. But, the
grievance must "[focus] on a particular project and [not be] dependent
on speculation about the possible actions of third parties not before
the court." 98
B. Nature of the Duty
No judicial decision has expressly held that a municipality has an
affirmative duty to zone so as to allow for senior citizen communities
where a demand exists. However, this writer submits that Weymouth,
when read in light of Mount Laurel,99 lends support to the proposition
that such a duty exists. In Mount Laurel, the New Jersey Supreme
Court established the proposition that municipalities have an affirma-
plaintiff's standing." Id., citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686--87 (1973);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972); Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
95. 97 S. Ct. at 563 (citations omitted).
96. It is unclear whether all of these elements are necessary. It would seem that
there were two distinct injuries to the developer in Arlington Heights: the economic
injury based on the expenditures already made, as well as the non-economic injury
suffered by defeat of the objective of making suitable low-cost housing available to a
needy group.
97. The Court found it unnecessary to decide this question since an individual
black plaintiff had standing to raise the issue of race discrimination. 97 S. Ct. at 562.
98. Id. at 563 (citation omitted).
99. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
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tive obligation to allow housing for all categories of people. A unani-
mous court held:
[T]he presumptive obligation arises for each such [developing]
municipality affirmatively to plan and provide, by its land use regula-
tions, the reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and
choice of housing, including, of course, low and moderate cost
housing, to meet the needs, desires and resources of all categories
of people who may desire to live within its boundaries. 10°
The Court then granted the township ninety days to remedy the
ordinance thwarting that opportunity by excluding low- and moderate-
cost housing when a regional demand for such housing had been
established.',"
The Weymouth court was quick to utilize Mount Laurel's
language: "[T]he concept of the 'general welfare' in land use regula-
tion is quite expansive, and encompasses the provision of housing
for all categories of people, including the elderly."'1 2 Thus, Weymouth
coupled with Mount Laurel results in an affirmative duty of develop-
ing'03 municipalities to assure adequate opportunities for the aged.
It appears that a municipality must provide for its fair share of
100. Id. at 728. Mountain and TPashman, JJ., concurred separately. Id. at 735.
Justice Pashman joined the opinion of the court, but he urged the court to, "go
farther and faster in its implementation of the principles announced" by laying down
broad guidelines for judicial review of municipal zoning decisions which effectuate
exclusionary zoning directed at the poor. Id.
101. Id. at 734.
102. 364 A.2d at 1030 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). But developers
"have no absolute right to construct a project of any size or shape in a district
selected by them, merely on the thesis that senior citizen housing promotes the public
welfare." Leon N. Weiner & Assoc., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 366 A.2d 696, 701
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). The court sustained the zoning board's denial of
an application for a variance to construct a senior citizen housing community. The
court limited the issue on appeal to "whether the discretionary and presumptively -valid
act of the board's denial is so arbitrary as to require judicial correction." Id. Weiner may
imply that Weymouth and Shepard give only the right to construct a community for
the aged, but not the obligation. However, the Weiner court noted that adequate pro-
vision had been made by the zoning board to permit housing for the aged in other
districts within the municipality. Id.
103. In Mount Laurel, the court placed the obligation to accommodate regional
needs only on "developing" municipalities. 336 A.2d at 717, 724. The court defined
"developing municipality" by excluding central cities, older built-up suburbs or areas
still rural and likely to continue that way. For an application of the "developing
municipality" theory of Mount Laurel, see Segal Construction Co. v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 341 A.2d 667 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975). See also Urban League v.
Mayor and Council of Carteret, 359 A.2d 526 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976). For the
possible effect of Mount Laurel on developed municipalities, see Ackerman, The Mount
Laurel Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of Zoning Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L.F.
1, 15.
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the elderly by considering the housing needs of the region. 0 4 This
concept inevitably leads to many problems. The problems inherent
in determining a municipality's obligation include the identification
of the relevant housing region and the determination of the munici-
pality's fair share of the region's housing. The pertinent criteria for
evaluating a municipality's fair share include: (1) the number of low-
or moderate-income households of elderly persons in the region; (2)
employment opportunity and growth potential; (3) population of
developing municipality; (4) extent of deficient housing; (5) per
capita fiscal capacity; (6) opportunity for growth as measured by land
size or availability of water and sewer facilities; and (7) growth in
residential units.0 5
An interesting problem presents itself when comparing the duty
imposed on municipalities in Mount Laurel and in Weymouth. Many
municipalities deplore the Mount Laurel obligation, for low-income
persons tend to increase the fiscal burden, but welcome the Weymouth
duty, since older persons without children decrease their financial
burden.
C. The Remedy
If the municipality itself has a duty to plan for and zone in a
manner which allows developers to build a fair share of housing for
the elderly, and if this obligation is not met, the right to initiate legal
action would presumably vest in those injured. Injured parties might
include developers and elderly persons seeking adequate accommoda-
tions. 106 A court could require that the municipality permit construc-
tion of an equitable share of housing units for the aged. The remedy
may also be statutory. Florida adopted the Local Government Compre-
hensive Planning Act of 1975.107 The act requires that counties and
104. Although the demand for housing by the elderly in Weymouth was small,
Weymouth Township was also responsible for its fair share of housing needed within
the surrounding region. 364 A.2d at 1030 n.9. See also Berenson v. Town of New Castle,
341 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1975), in which the court states: "[I]n enacting a zoning ordinance,
consideration must be given to regional needs and requirements." Id. at 242 (emphasis
supplied).
105. These factors were first suggested in Ackerman, supra note 103, at 27-28. See
also FAIR SHARE HOUSING DISTRIBUTION: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME? 353 (T. Nor-
man, ed. 1974).
106. But see notes 89-98 and accompanying text supra.
107. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161-.3211 (1975). For a discussion of this legislation, see
Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation,
74 MicH. L. REV. 899, 960-62 (1976). See also Note, Zoning and Population Control-
Courts are Reacting to New Problems in Old Ways, 5 FL. ST. U.L. REV. (1977).
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municipalities develop a comprehensive plan before they zone.'"8 It also
requires that municipalities consider the plans and needs of other
municipalities, make studies, make specific findings, and take into
account other factors before zoning is implemented." 9 The act pro-
vides that "[a]fter a comprehensive plan . ..has been adopted .. .
all development undertaken by, and all actions taken in regard to
development orders by, governmental agencies in regard to land
covered by such plan .. .shall be consistent with such plan .. . .
Comprehensive plans must be adopted on or before July 1, 1979.111
There is thus far no case law construing this portion of the act.
Although the Florida act does not specifically mention housing for
the aged, it does require the zoning municipality to consider such
factors as the provision of housing for existing residents, anticipated
population growth of the area, and provisions for low- and moderate-
income persons.112 And although not mandatory, the municipality may
consider other factors such as "design recommendations for land sub-
division, neighborhood development and redevelopment, design of
open space locations, and similar matters to the end that such recom-
mendations may be available as aids and guides to developers in the
future planning and development of land in the area."" 8
It is not certain that the act can be relied on for relief by elderly
persons, since the act does not require that a municipality specifically
take into account the needs of the elderly when forming a comprehen-
sive plan. Additionally, even if the municipality considers the needs
of the elderly, it may deem planned retirement communities in-
appropriate. Indeed, one could argue that providing other types of
services, e.g., meals on wheels, reduced busfare, homemaker services,
etc., is a better solution to the problems of the elderly than are planned
retirement communities, since such communities could result in
"ghettoization" of the elderly. The issue must ultimately be deter-
mined with reference to the extent and nature of the needs of the
elderly within each region. But regardless of which path the munici-
pality follows, the general purpose and intent of the act,"' namely,
to encourage the most appropriate use of land and other resources,
would seem to indirectly require the zoning municipality to consider
and provide for all special interest groups, including the aged.
108. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194 (1975).
109. Id.
110. Id. § 163.3194(1).
111. Id. § 163.3167(2).
112. Id. § 163.3177(6)(f)(1), (4).
113. ld. § 163.3177(7)(g).
114. Id. § 163.3161(3).
1977]
444 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.5:423
VI. THE FUTURE OF Weymouth
Two other substantial considerations have thus far not been
examined: (1) the needs of other special interest groups (e.g., handi-
capped persons), and (2) the problems of a municipality with unique
difficulties in maintaining its environment.
Presumably, the same considerations that apply to housing for
the aged apply to housing for the handicapped. Within any zoning
region, if there are a sufficient number of handicapped persons desiring
to live in a community for the disabled, and a developer is willing to
build, Weymouth should pave the way, at least in New Jersey. The
distinction between groups entitled to a Weymouth community and
those not so entitled should lie in the fact that the former group has
impaired physical abilities and extraordinary social and psychological
needs. Limiting Weymouth groups to this requirement prevents a
regression of the law to the "separate but equal" state endorsed by
Plessy v. Ferguson 15 and would alleviate the Weymouth plaintiffs'
concern that a ruling against them would result in "ghetto-like" segre-
gation. 116
Mount Laurel considered the problem of a municipality with
unique difficulties in maintaining its environment."' If a municipality
can demonstrate a substantial environmental problem, 18 the Mount
Laurel (and presumably the Weymouth) duties could be limited.
Concern for the potential conflict between zoning ordinances and
environmental problems generated the ALI Model Land Development
Code,"19 which has been adopted by several states,2 0  including
115. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
116. Brief for Plaintiff at 11-13, Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 364 A.2d
1016 (N.J. 1976).
117. See also Ackerman, supra note 103, at 44.
118. The possibility of a significant detrimental environmental effect has allowed for
exclusionary zoning before Mount Laurel. See, e.g., Gautier v. Town of Jupiter Island,
142 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (sustaining exclusionary ordinance enacted
to preserve unique historical status of town). See also 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 163 (1976).
If a fundamental right is abridged, however, the municipality would presumably be
required to demonstrate that the environmental issue presented a compelling state
interest.
119. ALI MODEL LAND DEV. CODE (1976). For a discussion of this legislation, see
Finnell, Saving Paradise: The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act
of 1972, 1973 URa. L. ANN. 103; Mandelker, Critical Area Controls: A New Dimension
in American Land Development Regulation, 41 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 21 (1975).
Additionally, the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 requires
municipal and county governments to engage in comprehensive land use planning. FLA.
STAT. § 163.3167 (1975). Environmental factors are among those elements which must be
considered in framing a comprehensive plan. Id. § 163.3177.
120. ME. REV, STAT. ANN, tit. 5, §§ 3310-14 (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
116G.07 (1977),
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Florida. 1 2  The Florida enactment gives the Governor and Cabinet,
sitting as the Administration Commission, authority to designate and
regulate areas of "critical state concern."' 2 However, this section was
recently declared unconstitutional. 12 Once an area is so designated,
local land development regulations must be approved by the state
agency,24 which considers the environmental impact of the proposed
development on both the region and the state as a whole. 25
Although it is not yet clear exactly how Weymouth and environ-
mental issues will interact, and although the future of Weymouth is
uncertain in other regards, the Weymouth decision was a major advance
in providing housing for the elderly. Although only New Jersey,"2 "
New York,'2 7 and Arizona12 8 have upheld housing communities for
the elderly, the New Jersey Supreme Court's well-reasoned opinion
should provide the leadership for other municipalities around the
nation to fulfill their obligations toward our nation's aged citizens.
ED STAFMAN
121. FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (1975), held unconstitutional in part, Cross Key Waterways v.
Askew, No. Y-362 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1977).
122. FLA. STAT. § 380.05 (1975), held unconstitutional, Cross Key Waterways v. Askew,
No. Y-362 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1977).
123. The First District Court of Appeal declared § 380.05 unconstitutional as an
invalid delegation of legislative authority. Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, No. Y-362
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1977). The opinion invalidates "the Act's delegation of
power to designate areas of critical state concern by criteria expressed in Section 380.05
(2)(a) and (b). [The] decision does not affect other aspects of the Act." Id. at 16-17.
124. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 380.05(6) (1975).
125. See, e.g., id. § 380.05(2). See also FLA. STAT. § 163.3177 (1975).
126. Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 364 A.2d 1016 (N.J. 1976); Shepard
v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 364 A.2d 1005 (N.J. 1976).
127. Maldini v. Ambro, 330 N.E.2d 403 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975).
128. Riley v. Stoves, 526 P.2d 747 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974).
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